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Humans are not rational beings. Deviations from rational-
ity in human thinking are currently well documented [25]
as non-reducible to rational pursuit of egoistic benefit or
its occasional distortion with temporary emotional excita-
tion, as it is often assumed. This occurs not only outside
conceptual reasoning or rational goal realization but also
subconsciously and often in certainty that they did not and
could not take place ‘in my case’. Non-rationality can no
longer be perceived as a rare affective abnormality in other-
wise rational thinking, but as a systemic, permanent quality,
’a design feature’ of human cognition. While social psychol-
ogy has systematically addressed non-rationality of human
cognition (including its non-emotional aspects) for decades
[63]. It is not the case for computer science, despite obvious
relevance for individual and group behavior modeling. This
paper proposes brief survey of work in computational dis-
ciplines related to human-like non-rationality modeling in-
cluding: Social Signal Processing, Cognitive Architectures,
Affective Computing, Human-Like Agents and Normative
Multi-agent Systems. It attempts to establish a common
terminology and conceptual frame for this extremely inter-
disciplinary issue, reveal assumptions about non-rationality
underlying the discussed models and disciplines, their cur-
rent limitations and potential in contributing to solution.
Finally, it also presents ideas concerning possible directions
of development, hopefully contributing to solution of this
challenging issue.
CCS Concepts
•Computing methodologies→Cognitive science; Mod-
eling methodologies; •Human-centered computing →
Social engineering (social sciences);
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rationality; irrationality; affective computing;cognitive ar-
chitectures; social simulation; multi-agent systems
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1. INTRODUCTION
This paper proposes a survey of work in computational
disciplines related to human-like non-rationality modeling
including: Social Signal Processing, Cognitive Architectures,
Affective Computing, Human-Like Agents and Normative
Multi-agent Systems. It attempts to establish a common
terminology and conceptual frame for this extremely inter-
disciplinary issue, to reveal assumptions about non-rationality
underlying the discussed models and disciplines, their cur-
rent limitations and potential in contributing to the solution.
Finally, it also presents ideas concerning possible directions
of development, hopefully contributing to a solution of this
challenging issue.
1.1 Humans are not rational
Humans are not rational beings. Image of eyes above cof-
fee contribution box in the office inclines people to pay more
often without supervision [6], without changing the situation
from an egoistic-utilitarian or even moral perspective. Attri-
bution of positive feature like intelligence to a person primes
us to attribute them with other positive qualities like hon-
esty or generosity, regardless of any statistical correlation
they may have, in a ’halo effect’ example [62]. Countless ex-
amples of this type occur not only outside conceptual reason-
ing or rational goal realization but also subconsciously and
often in certainty that they do not and could not take place
’in my case’. Habitual, gregarious, ritualistic, unconscious,
stereotypic and erroneous deviations from rationality in hu-
man thinking and behavior are currently well documented
[25] as non-reducible to rational pursuit of egoistic benefit
or its occasional distortion with temporary emotional exci-
tation, as it is often assumed. Non-rationality can no longer
be perceived as a rare affective abnormality in otherwise
rational thinking, but as a systemic, permanent quality, ’a
design feature’ of human cognition.
1.2 Social agents, culture and non-rationality
Tightly related to human non-rationality is the second
main topic of this paper - the struggle to understand so-
cial and cultural phenomena and its emergence in the micro
and macro scales. Traditionally a challenge of social sci-
ences, this problem has growing relevance for Cognitive Ar-
chitectures (CA), Agent Based Systems (ABS), Affective
Computing (AF), Social Signal Processing(SSP) and other
computational disciplines.
The interaction of human rationality and non-rationality
(affect, personality, habit and others) results in the emer-
gence of rituals, customs, stereotypes or prejudice, shaping
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social process and structure. Subconscious and sub-symbolic
aspects of identification, relations, values, power distribu-
tion, roles or norms determine objective group character
through agent actions as strong as (some would say stronger
than) their formal, explicit or rational counterparts, in a
process of culture emergence.
1.3 Situation in computational models
While social psychology has systematically addressed non-
rationality of human cognition (including its non-emotional
aspects) for decades [63]. It is not the case for computer
science, despite obvious relevance for individual and group
behavior modeling. Especially modeling of socio-cultural
non-rationality is still a relatively underdeveloped process,
despite its great relevance and normative-emotional power.
It remains a grand challenge due to its complex, informal
and fuzzy nature.
1.4 Structure of the paper
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next
section wider background of the problem is presented, in-
cluding discussion and formalization of the used terms and
brief history or rationalistic perspective in social sciences
and computer science. In section 3 a survey of work in com-
putational disciplines related to human-like non-rationality
modeling is proposed. It includes: Social Signal Processing,
Cognitive Architectures, Affective Computing, Human-Like
Agents and Normative Multi-agent Systems. Next, possi-
ble research directions are discussed. The paper ends with
summary.
2. BACKGROUND
To properly frame and present the problem of non-rationality
both well-defined terminology and a historical perspective
on human behavior modeling are useful and this section pro-
vides them shortly.
2.1 Terms and definitions
In this section most relevant terms are defined, to allow a
precise presentation. This includes comments on the distinc-
tion between rationality, irrationality and non-rationality,
definition of ’System 1’ and ’System 2’ and finally, ’cogni-
tive’ vs. ’non-cognitive’ process dichotomy.
2.1.1 Rationality, irrationality and non-rationality
In general, rational decision making is an analytic process
that operates on a formal conceptual model of the situation
and goals to be achieved in it. Potential alternative actions
are represented similarly and their consequences are calcu-
lated in a chain of reasoning that can be described, analyzed
and communicated. Evaluation of their expected outcomes
from the position of goals allows to select the optimal action.
Irrational decision is one that deviates from the optimal
action, regardless of the nature of the decision making pro-
cess. Non-rational decision making on the other hand is
one that is not based on the explicit representations, formal
reasoning and sequential analysis. It is heuristic and associa-
tive and often fast . Also, such process cannot normally be
communicated due to the aforementioned lack of formal and
explicit representations (making definition of non-rationality
dependent on decision what is considered formal/explicit in
a given case).
Irrationality therefore deviates from rationality by result,
while non-rationality by mode of work and one does not
imply the other (although they are often correlated). Ex-
ample: good heuristic may often provide a non-rational but
correct (so not irrational) choice, while error in formal rea-
soning provides an irrational but not non-rational answer.
Although irrationality is sometimes mentioned, the main in-
terest of this paper is (human-like) non-rationality and the
optimality of actions is secondary. Notably, this includes in
the scope of the paper human-like aspects, whose optimality
and therefore irrationality is at least practically problematic
to establish e.g. it is hard to say which types of personality
are ’irrational’ to have, but personality certainly belongs to
non-rational aspects of human-likeness.
This last difference between ’non-rational’ and ’irrational’
becomes crucial, when the goal or motivational aspect of the
decision making system is considered. As irrationality is de-
fined based on the optimality of goal realization, it is impos-
sible to describe any goal as irrational, including informal
and temporary urges or desires, even harmful or destruc-
tive ones. While formalism assessing (at least theoretically)
irrationality of specific goals/desires (for example of suici-
dal/murderous vs. altruistic ones) is probably possible in
the specific case of humans (e.g. based on the overall sub-
jective happiness obtained when specific goals are present)
human motivation particularities are trivially included as
human-like non-rationality.
2.1.2 ’System 1’ and ’System 2’
In the case of human decision makers, relation between
rationality and non-rationality is perhaps best addressed by
the dual process theory [63]. Its foundations are as old as
modern psychology and likely come from William James who
claimed there are two different kinds of thinking: associative
and true reasoning. Over the decades, this concept has been
developed and reformulated several times and has recently
been popularized by Kahneman who uses terms ’System 1’
(non-rational, associative intuition) and ’System 2’ (ratio-
nal, conceptual reasoning, see Table 1 for details). Dozens
of cognitive biases related to ‘System 1’ are known [25], in-
cluding :
• ’Anchoring effect’ - tendency to be influenced by irrel-
evant data. For example, when asked if Gandhi was
more than 114 years old when he died, people will pro-
vide a much larger estimate of his age at death than
when anchoring question referred to death at 35
• ’halo effect’ - tendency to ’transmit’ assessments of
others from one area of perceptions to another
• ’framing’ - drawing different conclusions from the same
information, depending on presentation
• ’pervasive optimistic bias’ - tendency to overestimate
benefits and underestimate costs e.g. in 2002 Amer-
ican kitchen remodeling was expected on average to
cost $18,658, but actually cost $38,769.
• ’substitution’ - ‘System 1’ tendency to substitute a dif-
ficult question with a simpler one
• anthropomorphism - tendency to characterize animals,
objects, and abstract concepts as possessing human-
like traits, emotions, and intentions
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Table 1: ’System 1’ vs. ’System 2’ comparison








Recognition, perception Rules, comparisons, analysis
Parallel Serial
Large Capacity Small Capacity
2.1.3 Cognitive and non-cognitive processes
Another popular distinction relevant to this discussion is
the one between cognitive and non-cognitive processes, as
’non-cognitive’ is often used where ’non-rational’ could per-
haps be a better alternative. For example, classification
of affect theories into cognitive and non-cognitive ones (see
3.3.1) distinguishes the latter as involving ’only nonproposi-
tional and possibly even nonconceptual mental representa-
tions’ [56] and the former as requiring ’certain higher-order
mental representations, in particular beliefs and desires’ [56].
This is somewhat counterintuitive, as ’cognition’ means
simply acquisition of knowledge ’through thought, experi-
ence, and the sense’ [16] and could perhaps be related to ei-
ther ’System 1’ or ’System 2’ acquisition. Indeed, ’usefulness
of this distinction has been questioned because of the vague-
ness and ambiguity of the term cognitive’ [56]. Defining
’cognitive’ process as acquiring some (even implicit) knowl-
edge within the system (e.g. by drilling basketball throws)
and ’non-cognitive’ process as free of such acquisition (e.g.
the same throws performed by a non-learning robot) while
using ’rational vs. non-rational’ or ’System 1 vs. System 2’
spectrum to describe the mode of this process could perhaps
help avoiding some confusion.
However, even if the initial definition is used, clear differ-
ence between ’rational’ and ’cognitive’ processes must be ob-
served, as the latter one simply involves some ’higher order’
representations or analysis while the former has demands
on all steps of the process, and so e.g. cognitive emotion
elicitation would still not be a rational process.
2.2 Abandoning homo-economicus
Decision making models in various fields including econ-
omy and computational behavior modeling assumed ’homo
economicus’ [26] i.e. perspective on humans as basically ra-
tional, self-interested and pursuing individual and autonomously
selected goals as optimally as possible. To understand the
situation in human non-rationality modeling, a certain his-
torical perspective on this concept is needed. Two relevant
trends are briefly presented in this section: one in social
sciences and another in computer simulation.
2.2.1 In traditional social sciences
First trend is a broad transition from rationalistic per-
spective on humans in social sciences, to one including con-
sistently irrational aspects. While psychologists always em-
phasized profound influence of strong emotion on human be-
havior, core of the new perspective is that source of human
irrationality is also non-affective. The new message is: we
are irrational even without emotional excitation. As Kahne-
man puts it ’at any given time scholars in a particular field
tend to share basic assumptions about their subject. Social
scientists in the 1970s broadly accepted two ideas about hu-
man nature. First, people are generally rational, and their
thinking is normally sound. Second, emotions such as fear,
affection, and hatred explain most of the occasions on which
people depart from rationality. Our article challenged both
assumptions.(...) We documented systematic errors in the
thinking of normal people, and we traced these errors to
the design of the machinery of cognition rather than to the
corruption of thought by emotion’ [28]. This paradigm shift
cannot be overestimated in any context of behavior modeling
- a fact reflected by Kahneman’s Nobel Prize in Economy.
2.2.2 In computer sciences
Second trend is a gradual inclusion of human-like elements
in Cognitive Architectures, Social Simulation, Multi Agents
Systems etc. While its traces may be tracked to the early
AI, mainstream AI embraced those notions only in the early
90’s, when fields like Affective Computing or now-classical
emotion models like OCC [51] gained attention. Only rel-
atively recently non-rationality became widely addressed in
the computational science and until now mostly in its most
traditional i.e. affective dimension. This delay is under-
standable due to the engagement in pragmatic ’rational’
challenges (planning, image recognition, language processing
etc.), background of the researchers and what Picard called
emotion’s ’stigma’ in science [54]. Moreover, non-affective
non-rationality modeling suffers from inherent inaccessibil-
ity of subconscious structures and limited data for validation
of the models. Following analysis of how most relevant do-
mains and specific models include aspects of non-rationality,
will provide opportunity for concrete examples.
3. RELEVANT DOMAINS
This section discusses how achievements and limitations
of existing domains are linked to the problem of human-
like non-rationality, especially in the social context. The
addressed fields are: Social Signal Processing, Cognitive Ar-
chitectures, Affective Computing, Social Agents with per-
sonality and Normative ABS in Computational Sociology.
3.1 Social Signal Processing
Growing domain of Social Signal Processing (SSP) is in-
terested in imitating a set of human ’ability to express and
recognize social signals like turn taking, agreement, polite-
ness, empathy, friendliness, conflict, etc.’ [52] and to ’man-
age them in order to get along well with others while winning
their cooperation’ [52]. The ultimate goal of SSP are com-
puter systems ’capable of sensing agreement, inattention, or
dispute, and capable of adapting and responding in real-time
to these social signals in a polite, non-intrusive, or persuasive
manner, are likely to be perceived as more natural, effica-
cious, and trustworthy’ [52]. Three tasks are therefore at
its core, namely analysis, modeling and generation of social
signals, understood as communicative and informative mes-
sages (conscious or not) related to social facts. These social
facts are typically categorized as:
• social interaction - specific instance of social event sig-
naled through nods manifesting agreement, blink man-
ifesting intimacy etc.
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• social emotion - subset of emotion related to others
like envy or empathy, signaled by tone, gestures etc.
• social evaluation - assessments of characteristics of a
person or group based on certain standards.
• social attitudes - a broad category defined as a ten-
dency to behave in a certain way towards person or a
group.
• social relation - relation towards agent(s) or group(s)
based on co-dependence of their goals e.g. dependency,
competition, exploitation etc. This concept notably in-
cludes social roles understood as behavior expectation
patterns.
Signals related to the above social facts manifest through
multi-modal cues like ’facial expressions, body postures and
gestures, vocal outbursts like laughter, etc.’ which can be
automatically analyzed by technologies of signal processing.
This domain is at its early stage, it is still addressing its
basic research questions and many problems have only been
addressed recently. Works addressing non-verbal social in-
teraction analysis in small groups have been presented by
Gatica-Perez [23], Gunes surveys recognition of emotion [24]
and Kleinsmith affective bodily expression recognition [32].
Work on evaluations and attitudes, is more scarce. Exam-
ples include facial attractiveness estimation [27], automatic
assessment of agreement [27]. In comparison, there is a great
number of works related to social relations (roles in partic-
ular) e.g. recognition of roles in shows [57] and meetings
[53].
3.1.1 Relation to non-rationality and limitations
From the perspective of SSP, human-like non-rationality
should not be seen as a separate category but rather one
pervading all the mentioned social fact classes and cognitive
processes causing them. For example, social evaluations and
attitudes have been proven to be heavily influenced by spe-
cific ’System 1’ particularities, like the mentioned cognitive
biases. Social relations often depend on non-rational, con-
text and culture dependent patterns that have no justifica-
tion but a habitually repeated cultural transmission. All of
them are known to rely on stereotypes maintained to support
mentioned habits or mental processes like self-identification
and other human-specific social needs.
This relates to a potential weakness of SSP as an approach
to human-like non-rational phenomena modeling. The very
term ’Social Signal’ ties attention to the surface, specific and
behavioral aspect i.e. visible communication, while develop-
ments in cognitive science and psychology provided knowl-
edge about general, deep and cognitive characteristics and
limitations that influence not only social interaction. Popu-
lar solutions often used in SSP like hidden Markov models,
conditional random fields or deep belief networks, are prag-
matic and effective in specific tasks, but they do not take
advantage of knowledge about human ’System 1’ nor help
to model it in a broader scope. In this, we agree with Pan-
tic et. al. who pointed out that SSP would benefit from
addressing some of its challenges, specifically signal contex-
tuality as ’one complex problem rather than a number of
detached problems in human sensing, context sensing, and
human behaviour understanding’[52]. Therefore, signal pro-
cessing techniques effective at particular tasks (like gesture
recognition) need to be placed in a context of general cogni-
tive architectures (discussed in the next section) to provide
a broad computational theory of human-like non-rationality.
3.2 Cognitive Architectures
Requirement to place a specified theory in a concrete,
’default’ cognitive environment (as postulated above) is a
typical problem faced in application or validation in var-
ious domains (including SSP) and one of the motivations
to develop Cognitive Architectures. Cognitive Architecture
(CA) is a model of artificial, computational processes, aim-
ing to resemble human cognitive abilities. It possesses a
broad spectrum of intelligence, as opposed to being a solu-
tion to one particular narrow task. As Ng states ’cognitive
architecture can be defined as a single system that is capable
of producing all aspects of behavior, while remaining con-
stant across various domains and knowledge bases’ [50]. Sun
puts it shortly: ’cognitive architecture is a domain-generic
computational cognitive model’ [60].
When describing CA, it is meaningful to distinguish be-
tween psychologically and engineering oriented ones. The
latter are designed for purely pragmatically purposes, while
the former aim at a relative structural and functional cog-
nitive realism and human-likeness, and are designed as a
research tool of cognitive scientists: ’Cognitive architecture
provides a concrete framework for more detailed modeling
of cognitive phenomena, through specifying essential struc-
tures, divisions of modules, relations between modules, and
so on. Its function is to provide an essential framework to
facilitate more detailed modeling and understanding of var-
ious components and processes of the mind. It forces one
to think in terms of process, and in terms of detail. In-
stead of using vague, purely conceptual theories, cognitive
architectures force theoreticians to think clearly. They are
critical tools in the study of the mind’ [61]. For the en-
gineering oriented architectures, psychological realism is a
minor concern and their design structure reflects problem
space, rather than human mind. Besides theoretical impor-
tance both psychological and engineering oriented CA also
have a direct, practical and commercial use and have been
used successfully, to solve complex tasks. For our purposes,
psychologically believable ones are more interesting. Exam-
ples of prominent CA that are symbolic, production based
systems: SOAR [36], Icarus [37] for hybrid neural-symbolic
systems examples are Epic [31], Clarion[60] and ACT-R [2].
Many good and detailed overviews exist [13, 18, 38].
The most direct limitation of pure CA from the perspec-
tive of human-like non-rationality is the fact that most of
them are focused on solving traditional challenges of AI like
reasoning, planing, language processing etc. leading to ini-
tial marginalization of non-rationality even in its most obvi-
ous i.e. affective form. This remark is however not true for
Cognitive-Affective Architectures described below.
3.3 Affective Computing, Cognitive Affective
Architectures and Human-Like Agents
As mentioned, traditional AI (including traditional CA)
has been developed for a long time with a wide disregard
to human-like non-rationality, including emotion. Affective
Computing (AC) is a developing, interdisciplinary discipline
that started after Picard’s paper [54], as a reaction to this
tendency. It encompasses the development of systems that
can recognize, model and generate human affects and draws
CASA 2016 14
from computer science, psychology, and cognitive science.
Besides the ability to understand, react to and generate af-
fect, AC addresses question how affect sensing and generat-
ing technology influences human-computer interactions and
how it may improve them.
3.3.1 Traditional theories of emotion
Over the decades psychology developed countless incom-
patible emotion theories, none of them formulated in a com-
putable language, very few formal enough to be a direct base
for computational model and most expressed in a way that
makes it difficult to relate them to others. This historical
heritage creates a monumental task for both computer sci-
entists and modern psychologists attempting to reconstruct
those theories in a common computational platform for re-
search, validation or practical application.
There are various ways in which countless theories of emo-
tion can be divided, with perhaps the most popular dis-
tinction of emotion elicitation theories into cognitive versus
non-cognitive ones (as understood e.g. by Reisenzein et. al.
[56], see 2.3.1). In psychology, discussion about the scope of
non-cognitive emotion is controversial, partly due to obscu-
rity of the term ’cognitive’. Most relevant cognitive theory
(and emotion theory in general) is the appraisal theory [4,
22], ’a predominant force among psychological perspectives
on emotion and arguably the most fruitful source for those
interested in the design of symbolic AI systems, as it em-
phasizes and explains the connection between emotion and
cognition’ [42].
3.3.2 Computational models of emotion
To achieve computational models of emotions, first re-
construction into formal but implementation-independent
languages is required. Its goal to is improve the original
theories by achieving greater formalization, forcing clarifica-
tion and disambiguation in preparation for implementation,
while avoiding complexities related to implementational de-
tails. First language proposed for formalizing psychological
emotion theories was the set theory [10] due to its formalism,
expressiveness and close relation to computational theories.
In this way, general model of cognitive-appraisal theories
was initially formalized [10].
Later other formalisms were used, notably representation
of emotion theories in agent logics that exchanged some ex-
pressiveness for easier specification. Especially belief-desire-
intention (BDI) model [55] provided a convenient concep-
tual environment, as most emotion theories use beliefs and
desires as their base. The fact that they are already pro-
vided by BDI, has allowed an easy specification and on the
other hand a link to rational decision making already speci-
fied with BDI . Therefore, many theories were realized using
BDI e.g. emotions related to expectations [12], four basic
emotions [46] and most notably two formalizations [56, 1]
of the 22 emotions of the OCC theory [51] that became a
dominant standard in many practical applications.
3.3.3 Cognitive-Affective Architectures
Finally, the general purpose CA (see section 3.2) were also
used as means of specification of affect theories. They offered
freedom from irrelevant implementation efforts and decisions
and more complete environment for the tested theories by
providing the ’default’, approximated answers. As a result,
a subgroup of CA appeared: Cognitive-Affective Architec-
tures (CAA) [65]. CAA addresses not only specification of
affect generation model but also relation between affect and
rationality, allowing formal and more complete specification
of emotion effect theories. CAA have been developed both as
tools in academic research, human-machine interfaces [30],
entertainment [59], training or advertising [65]. Generally,
academic CAA are theoretically more sound, while non-
academic CAA address greater spectrum of features. Be-
lievable affective modeling of ’Artificial Humans’ is a field
in itself. Examples of CAA include: Soar-Emote [40], that
combined implementation of both physiological and emotion
cognitive emotion theories in SOAR or appraisal theory im-
plementation in a computational model EMA [41]. For com-
prehensive overview of CAA please refer to [39, 65].
3.3.4 Issues with personality in Human-Like Agents
As the development of CAA progressed, virtual [64] and
robotic human-like agents made significant advance. For this
class of CAA, believability and attractiveness for the users is
often the key goal. This caused inclusion of other aspects of
human-like non-rationality, notably personality.Concept of
personality embodies the assumption about individual be-
havioral coherence and consistency existing as object-like
entity invariable throughout contexts. A century of intensive
efforts in identification of this entity proved this assumption
surprisingly unfruitful [47], as dispositional differences be-
tween individuals are consistently found to be smaller than
between-situation differences for one individual [20] (Figure
1). This fact cannot be explained by the prominent ’trait
models’, like Five Feature Model (FFM)[44] that emerged
from this perspective.
Domination of Five Feature Model (FFM) as a personal-
ity model in simulations, while understandable due to simple
form and easily obtainable parametrization, comes at a price
of serious limitations implied by any ’trait model’. Their
drawbacks as descriptive tools are multiplied when they are
used as generating mechanisms. The fact that ’trait mod-
els’ are descriptive and are in no sense prescriptive in terms
of cognition is vastly ignored in computational modeling.
When used for behavior generation those ’average attitude
values’ produce uniform, flat personality that undermines
psychological believability. This is exactly due to the nega-
tion of contextual cognitive-affective changes. FFM has been
theoretically criticized in psychology, as addressing ’surface,
easily noticeable aspects of personality and neglecting more
private or context-dependent ones’ [43].
In practice, ’agreeable’ or ’extrovert’ FFM based charac-
ter is ’agreeable’ or ’extrovert’ in all contexts, with no struc-
tured individualized variability, resulting in a predictability
that fails to surprise in a new context like a fearful mother’s,
bravery when her children are threatened. This flaw is not
limited to FFM and extends to all ’trait models’, like PEN
[21] and other, less popular ones. All of this has understand-
able consequences for individual modeling but, less obvi-
ously, models of non-rational components (like personality)
are becoming a bottle neck in multi-agent and agent based
social simulations [33, 29].
3.3.5 CAA and irrationality
The development of CAA within CA exemplifies the shift
towards models including affect and in the broader perspec-
tive abandonment of rationalistic paradigm by inclusion of
non-rational aspects.
CASA 2016 15
However, even CAA are a) limited to affective non-rationality
leaving out other ’System 1’ particularities (see 2.1.2) and b)
designed with a focus on individual and used in separation
(with the exception of Clarion [60]) and ignore many mech-
anisms of social cognition crucial in sociological psychology.
Therefore CAA (including Clarion) do not explicitly model
’System 1’ mechanisms, particularly social and cultural ones
like social context cognition, stereotypical agent perception
or human-like identity management. As a result, interaction
of multiple CAA does not manifest rich and complex social
structures, and other phenomena found in animals, let alone
humans.
CA evolved to CAA by including affect, but have yet
to embrace the non-affective and socio-cognitive ’System 1’
mechanisms. Complexity of the traditional CA problems
forced a focus on individual, affective and rational cogni-
tion and little effort has been put into the development of
CAA in social simulations. Paradoxically, this focus on in-
dividual not only limited CAA capabilities in group social
simulation but also in modeling of individuals. ’System 1’
manifests not only as affective dispositions manifesting in
separation, but also in normative and cultural patterns like
interpretations of social contexts, taboos or subscriptions of
group identities and related stereotypes. Those elements are
an important factor even in individual interaction, but are
easier to omit in individual agents than other features like
affect or personality. ’Studies with synthetic characters have
so far infrequently considered the link between behavior and
culture, it may become an invisible background; directly en-
coded into the design’ [5].
3.4 Normative Multi-agent Systems in Com-
putational Sociology
Despite high level of sophistication CA and CAA are rarely
used to address socio-cognitive problems or to model related
’System 1’ non-rationality. In this section we investigate how
those issues are approached in a domain directly addressing
human-like social phenomena interaction of multiple entities
i.e. Multi-agent Systems (MAS) applied to Computational
Sociology.
3.4.1 Paradigm issues in Social Sciences
Traditional Social Sciences remain torn by the fact that
culture is central to them and yet it defies rigorous and fruit-
ful research [11]. As a result, many branches of social sci-
ence surprisingly downplay ’culture’ as a term (implicitly or
explicitly), while easy quantification of economical or struc-
tural factors leads to easily verifiable hypothesis, concept of
culture became a ’conceptual garbage can’ for poorly defined
mechanisms [45]. Its use to explain any effects by trivially
labeling them ’a cultural influence’ has made the term un-
popular, as explaining nothing in reality. It has been argued
that this inability to properly address culture is a key fac-
tor keeping branches of social science ’fractionated , each
speaking their own, often mutually unintelligible languages
and holding assumptions and theories that are mutually in-
compatible’ [45].
Ontologically, socio-cultural properties emerge from psy-
chological ones. Inability of social sciences to capture this
with sufficient formality results in disparity between descrip-
tion levels. This leads to macro-scale models represent-
ing culture ’as an object’ with underrepresented emergent,
process-like aspects, leaving out accumulated micro-scale
psychological knowledge. While the fear of reductionist is-
sues (i.e. reluctance to reduce sociology to psychology) plays
a role, the micro-macro gap must be primarily attributed
to limitations of the traditional verbal models and techni-
cal difficulties of creating quantitative, computational ones,
surpassing expertise of social scientists.
3.4.2 Promise of computational social sciences. Nor-
mative Multi-agent Systems
At least since Axelrod [15] computational models are seen
as a potential platform to unify and formalize the description
of culture. Computationally, perhaps the most promising
methodologies are based on a concept of agenthood, par-
ticularly normative Multi-agent Systems (MAS) has been
explored greatly. As Neuman puts it ’cognitive architecture
of the agents provides an objective reconstruction of the sub-
jective dimension of norms. This provides a bridge between
positivistic and phenomenological theory traditions. On the
other hand, the inclusion of norms into the framework of the
principally individualistic approach of agent based modeling
provides an attempt to overcome the classical micro-macro
divide.’ [49].
In MAS, norms are on the one hand seen as pragmatic
tools of distributed control assuring properties of a designed
system and on the other as providing a bottom-up, indi-
vidualistic explanation of social phenomena, when used in
Computational Sociology. The term ’norm’ is ambiguous in
MAS and its intra-agent representation is not standardized
[49]. Most popular choice are constraints i.e. hard limi-
tations on agent actions designed off-line or obligations i.e.
explicit conditional prescriptions incorporated e.g. in BOID
architectures [7]. Rarely more complex mental objects are
mentioned, usually moral norms and values [8] that accumu-
late all relevant cognitive aspects ill-represented by ’it-then’
rules. Even when a norm is not simply seen as an exter-
nal behavior regularity (e.g. ’all agents use right side of the
road’) the cognitive complexity of its representation is low
compared to the mechanisms postulated in sociology.
3.4.3 Normative Multi-agent Systems and human-like
non-rationality
There is a tendency in MAS, going back to Epstein [15] to
identify culture with a) norm emergence as a behavior pat-
tern propagation, b) external products of a) like trade and
relation networks, production and consumption patterns,
life span or housing distributions [15]. An implicit assump-
tion that this reasonably approximates culture is based on a
broad application of norms in psychology, as ’cultural prod-
uct including values, customs, traditions etc.’ [58]. This is
however unjustified, considering narrow redefinition of the
term in MAS. The fact that abstract conditional rules are
not a good model of the innate habitual, affective and other
complex particularities of normative mechanisms discussed
in social psychology is usually silently ignored.
Externalistic focus and basic assumption of MAS to cre-
ate complexity with interaction of simple agents promote
cognitive over-simplicity. It also has trivial technical justifi-
cation: agents with complex cognitive components are hard
to model, implement, parametrize and validate. Constraints
and obligations are easy to use, but ’it requires a lot to trans-
form morality into a computational approach. It is still an
open research question how this can be realized’ [49]. This
is even more true in a broader case of culture. Attempts to
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address this issue exist outside the MAS mainstream but are
relatively limited. Breen [8] uses ’metanorms’ to explicitly
separate culture, and norms and to show how ’culture af-
fects the possibility of normative changes, in particular the
acceptance of policies’ [8]. Kochanowicz [33, 34] proposes a
model for MAS uniting norms, culture and personality on
a level of social context cognition. Dignum et. al. propose
increase in social context awareness, introduction of identity
management and mention relevance of Dual process theory
[17]. Despite similar attempts, psychological mechanisms
of culture emergence and internalization are both rare and
highly non-trivial - the solution to the posted problem ex-
ceeds traditional MAS expertise.
4. POSSIBLE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Based on the state of the major related fields with rela-
tion to human-like non-rationality and after discussing their
limitations and potential in previous section, this section
presents ideas and possible directions of future development.
4.1 CAA-MAS unification. Closing immergence-
emergence loop
The starting observation is, that there is a great need
for theoretical and implementational unification of the ex-
ternalist, objective approach to normative-cultural phenom-
ena represented by MAS or organization modeling with the
internalist, cognitive present in CAA. MAS directly tackle
the problem of socio-normative emergence, but depth of this
pursuit is limited by the psychological complexity of the used
agents. On the other hand CAA provide complex, affectively
and cognitively believable agents, but are designed and used
for investigation of the individual not social and cultural di-
mensions. Strengths and limitations of MAS and CAA are
then complementary and despite the fact that they are sepa-
rate disciplines with their own goals, their unification would
be beneficial for simulations of human-like non-rationality
and could improve modeling of both group and individual
behavior. Additionally, CAA and MAS share a challenge:
both are yet to explicitly incorporate ’System 2’ mechanisms
of human-like non-rationality especially in social cognition.
On a theoretical level, postulated unification can be framed
as a circular dependency between the components of emergence-
immergence duality [3]: collective feature formation of the
group from individual behavior features and cultural influ-
ence of the group on the individual cognition. As Conte et
al. put it: ’The interplay between the mental and the social
dynamics allows norms to emerge and change. Observable
conformity is only the tip of the normative iceberg. The cru-
cial dynamics lies in the minds of the agents, beneath the
line of observation. Norms cannot emerge in society unless
they previously immerge in the mind, i.e. get converted into
mental representations. Agents abiding with norms, or vi-
olating them, act on a set of specific, norm-related, mental
representations’ [14]. In both MAS and CAA, emergence-
immergence loop is then ’broken’, but the reasons are oppo-
site. CAA provide complexity of cognitive models that could
support culture immergence, but as they are not designed
for and used in multi-agent, culture forming interactions this
does not take place. MAS focus directly on the emergence
but simple agents cause insufficient immergence: despite
great popularity of norm simulations, cultural-normative im-
mergence in cognition is still marginal. As Neumann puts it,
’future work could profit from a finer-grained resolution of
internal processes of normative reasoning based on explicit
representations of norms. While agent-based modeling has
reached a substantial understanding of inter-agent processes,
an investigation of the recursive impact of inter- and intra-
agent processes is still in its fledgling stages’ [48].
4.2 Formalizing human-like non-rationality
On a practical level, essential question is: what form should
’System 1’ immergence take, specifically? It is a great re-
search question, nevertheless some initial directions and ideas
are proposed in this section. Most generally put, to model
human-like non-rationality one must understand it in terms
of the cognitive evolution. Human intelligence is not a gen-
eral problem solver, but a historical and specific response to
a particular survival task. Specifically, ’System 1’ cultural
immergence mechanisms were developed under evolutionary
pressure to enable socialization in groups, shaping features
of cognition to the degree that made many evolutionary an-
thropologists see this process, as one of the main reasons
for the astonishing human brain development [19]. This im-
plies at least three types of evolutionary contributions to
non-rationality that models need to account for.
First, as evolution is based on the selection of genes not
individuals, it promotes those non-rational mechanisms in
individuals that serve the survival of the population shar-
ing given genes, even at the cost of that individual (making
those mechanisms irrational from the egoistic perspective).
Those mechanisms include explicitly altruistic or pro-social
needs and capabilities, but also more subtle mechanisms of
group synchronization, improving its coordination and func-
tioning and thus survival. Those mechanisms include needs
and abilities to perceive, process and produce social struc-
ture, hierarchy or rules. Those mechanisms probably also
provided a cognitive base for what later became morality,
informal laws, religion or fashions. Those group-centered
’System 1’ needs and abilities of their realization are a pri-
mary source of non-rational phenomena that will not emerge
from an interaction of rational agents with egoistic goals.
Second implication is that some cognitive mechanisms ef-
fective in the past are suboptimal in modern contexts. Their
particularity must also be included in the relevant models.
This includes not only the clearly damaging tendencies like
extreme anger, urges to kill or rape, that were valid means of
protecting or spreading genes in the past and have opposite
effect currently, but also less dramatic consequences of our
genetic heritage. It could even be argued that entire human
affective constitution is an atavistic answer to problems bet-
ter addressed with reason, although such statement would
probably be too strong.
Finally, aspect is related to the fact that evolution is a
random process constrained by its ’medium’ i.e. organic
matter with physical limitations in terms of speed of oper-
ation, adaptivity etc. Notably ’inertia’ and habitual nature
of human decision making is less frequently mentioned then
its resource (temporal and computational) limitations.
4.2.1 Internal reconstruction of social concepts
First specific implication of the above points is that human-
like non-rationality will not only require explicit norm rep-
resentations (like Neumann and others suggested), but a full
redefinition of social concepts like ’role’, ’group’ etc. from
organizational to a cognitive dimension. This is needed, as
they are a base of the mentioned ’System 1’ pro-social and
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group synchronizing capabilities.
For example, while in MAS ’role’ usually represents ob-
jective, external agent differentiation within an organiza-
tion, it must also be present as a subjective, cognitive di-
mension, based on internal image of a role as a psycho-
logical, normative ’archetype’ that may fit the objective
functional or organizational role, or not. Individual, in-
ternal role definitions may vary and change substantially,
even within one group, while formal and external organiza-
tional aspects emerge from them and via synchronization-
penalization mechanism that ensure that subjective varia-
tions do not endanger the group. Analogously norms, group
identities etc. should be reintroduced from objective to sub-
jective space.
4.2.2 ’System 1’ social context cognition
Above internal representations are the building blocks of
human-like abilities realizing evolutionary promoted group
synchronization, notably human-like ’System 1’ ability to
constantly maintain appropriate social context understand-
ing. Humans flexibly adopt behavioral and normative stan-
dards to the circumstances of the social situation in a sub-
tle, intuitive and subconscious manner and even individu-
als declaring a monolithic formal moral code, are influenced
by this process. While general formal values or norms are
often valid in most contexts, informal normative disposi-
tions are characterized by context dependence, inconsisten-
cies and fluid change, that implies a non-trivial management
system based on a social context monitoring, rather than a
static, uniform norm hierarchy, as it is the case in current
CAA or MAS models.
The details of such social context cognition model are an
open question. One possible source of the relevant compo-
nents could for example be a Dramaturgical Theory (DT)
[9]. According to its original, sociological formulation, all
human behavior is inherently social and identity is not a sta-
ble, independent entity, but is constantly altered according
to the specific contexts. More precisely, innate human social
cognition is best described using terminology of a stage per-
formance. The concept of a ’role’ is central in DT, as a norm
aggregating entity, not as an external, institutional group
function atom, but an individually constructed, normative
unit, constantly defined anew. Both role definitions and
their subscriptions to agents are subjective, possibly conflict-
ing with the views of other agents and may change. Similarly
’scene’ with ’social scripts’ refers to informal classes of so-
cial situations, with norms, goals, rituals, plans or emotional
settings, subjectively perceived as acceptable in a given con-
text. Individual content is constantly synchronized via social
feedback, making it inter-subjective rather than purely sub-
jective. Some terms relevant to the ’dramaturgical context
cognition’ can be found in some of the existing architectures
(especially ’social role’), but are only rarely grouped to form
a complete ’System 1’ social context cognition system usable
in CAA, see [35, 33, 34]. Non-exhaustive list of concepts to
consider in such internal context cognition model includes:
group stereotypes representing collective characteristics, the
nature of group’s relationships and atmosphere e.g. ’friends’,
’family’, ’religious’ or ’militaristic’ group; role archetypes,
standing for the informal agent function; social situations
representing intuitive social scenes; values, abstract quali-
ties like ’virtue’, ’honor’; internal norms pointing to socially
acceptable behavior and socially imposed behavior limita-
tions.
4.2.3 Implicit culture. From symbolic models to partly
connectionist hybrids
Formal and explicitly formulated concepts and rules are
only a narrow class of both intra and inter-agent norma-
tive, social and cultural signals. Externally, culture mani-
fests both formally as laws-rules-norms and as informal pat-
terns of behavior or feedback. Also internally, it immerges
both as formal concepts and as informal, decentralized fea-
tures of emotionality, temperament or implicit social expec-
tations, often subconsciously obtained and used. Therefore,
predominantly used formal predicate based models may not
be optimal in handling ’System 1’ aspects of those signals.
Instead, connectionist representations may be better suited
for modeling sub-symbolic, fuzzy, decentralized and associa-
tive nature of informal culture and thus social agents may
benefit from incorporating both approaches.
5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This paper presented a survey of work in computational
disciplines related to human-like non-rationality modeling,
including: Social Signal Processing, Cognitive Architectures,
Affective Computing, Human-Like Agents and Normative
Multi-agent Systems with analysis of their current limita-
tions and potential in contributing to the ability to ade-
quately address human-like non-rationality. To enable pre-
cise presentation, key terms were clarified and background
of the rationalistic perspective on the behavior simulation
was presented. Finally, a proposal of directions and ideas
for future development was discussed.
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immergence of norms in agent worlds, pages 1–14.
Springer, 2009.
[15] J. S. Dean, G. J. Gumerman, J. M. Epstein, R. L.
Axtell, A. C. Swedlund, M. T. Parker, and
S. McCarroll. Understanding anasazi culture change
through agent-based modeling. Dynamics in human
and primate societies, pages 179–205, 2000.
[16] O. E. Dictionary. Oxford english dictionary online.
Mount Royal College Lib., Calgary, 14, 2004.
[17] F. Dignum, V. Dignum, C. Jonker, and R. Prada.
Situational deliberation; getting to social intelligence.
Computational Social Science and Social Computer
Science: Two Sides of the Same Coin, 2014.
[18] W. Duch, R. J. Oentaryo, and M. Pasquier. Cognitive
architectures: Where do we go from here? Frontiers in
artificial intelligence and applications, 171:122, 2008.
[19] R. I. Dunbar. The social brain hypothesis. brain, 9:10,
1998.
[20] S. Epstein. The stability of behavior: I. on predicting
most of the people much of the time. Journal of
personality and social psychology, 37(7):1097, 1979.
[21] H. J. Eysenck. Dimensions of personality: 16, 5 or
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M. Mehu, C. Pelachaud, I. Poggi, M. Schroeder, and
A. Vinciarelli. Social signal processing: the research
agenda. In Visual analysis of humans, pages 511–538.
Springer, 2011.
[53] F. Pianesi, M. Zancanaro, E. Not, C. Leonardi,
V. Falcon, and B. Lepri. Multimodal support to group
dynamics. Personal and Ubiquitous Computing,
12(3):181–195, 2008.
[54] R. W. Picard. Affective computing. 1995.
[55] A. S. Rao, M. P. Georgeff, et al. Bdi agents: From
theory to practice.
[56] R. Reisenzein, E. Hudlicka, M. Dastani, J. Gratch,
K. Hindriks, E. Lorini, and J.-J. C. Meyer.
Computational modeling of emotion: Toward
improving the inter-and intradisciplinary exchange.
Affective Computing, IEEE Transactions on,
4(3):246–266, 2013.
[57] H. Salamin, S. Favre, and A. Vinciarelli. Automatic
role recognition in multiparty recordings: Using social
affiliation networks for feature extraction. Multimedia,
IEEE Transactions on, 11(7):1373–1380, 2009.
[58] M. Sherif. The psychology of social norms. 1936.
[59] D. J. Sollenberger and M. P. Singh. Architecture for
affective social games, pages 79–94. Springer, 2009.
[60] R. Sun. The clarion cognitive architecture: Extending
cognitive modeling to social simulation. Cognition and
multi-agent interaction, pages 79–99, 2006.
[61] R. Sun. Cognitive architectures and multi-agent social
simulation, pages 7–21. Springer, 2009.
[62] E. L. Thorndike. A constant error in psychological
ratings. Journal of applied psychology, 4(1):25–29,
1920.
[63] A. Tversky and D. Kahneman. Judgment under
uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. science,
185(4157):1124–1131, 1974.
[64] Z. Yumak, J. Ren, N. M. Thalmann, and J. Yuan.
Modelling multi-party interactions among virtual
characters, robots, and humans. Presence:
Teleoperators and Virtual Environments,
23(2):172–190, 2014.
[65] G. Zacharias, J. MacMillan, and S. B. Van Hemel.
Behavioral modeling and simulation: from individuals
to societies. National Academy Press, 2008.
CASA 2016 20
